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The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population 
Prospect Axiology (Independently of Finite  
Fine-Grainedness) 
Elliott Thornley* 
Abstract: Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems purport to 
demonstrate that no population axiology can satisfy each of a 
small number of intuitively compelling adequacy conditions. 
However, it has recently been pointed out that each theorem 
depends on a dubious assumption: Finite Fine-Grainedness. This 
assumption states that there exists a finite sequence of slight 
welfare differences between any two welfare levels. Denying 
Finite Fine-Grainedness makes room for a lexical population 
axiology which satisfies all of the compelling adequacy 
conditions in each theorem. Therefore, Arrhenius’s theorems fail 
to prove that there is no satisfactory population axiology. 
In this paper, I argue that Arrhenius’s theorems can be 
repurposed. Since all of our population-affecting actions have a 
non-zero probability of bringing about more than one distinct 
population, it is population prospect axiologies that are of 
practical relevance, and amended versions of Arrhenius’s 
theorems demonstrate that there is no satisfactory population 
prospect axiology. These impossibility theorems do not depend 
on Finite Fine-Grainedness, so lexical views do not escape them. 
1. Introduction 
Some possible populations are better than others. For example, a population in 
which every person lives a wonderful life is better than a population in which 
those same people live awful lives. What’s more, this betterness relation holds (at 
least sometimes) between populations that differ in size. A population in which 
every person lives a wonderful life is better than a marginally bigger population 
in which every person lives an awful life. 
These cases are clear-cut, but others are less certain. Is a population in 
which one million people live a wonderful life better than a population in which 
one billion people live a good life? Is a population in which two million people 
live wonderful lives and one million people live awful lives better than a 
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population in which no one lives at all? It would be useful to have a population 
axiology – a betterness ordering over populations – to adjudicate in cases like 
these. 
Unfortunately, formulating a satisfactory population axiology has proved 
difficult. Indeed, some claim that it is impossible. Several authors offer 
impossibility theorems purporting to demonstrate that no population axiology can 
satisfy a small number of adequacy conditions.1 Arrhenius’s six theorems 
represent the state-of-the-art.2 They employ logically weaker and intuitively more 
compelling adequacy conditions than other theorems extant in the literature, and 
so have drawn much of the scholarly attention. 
However, it has recently been pointed out that each of Arrhenius’s six 
theorems rests on a dubious assumption (Thomas 2018; Carlson forthcoming). 
The assumption, which has been dubbed Finite Fine-Grainedness, states that 
one can get from a very positive welfare level to a very negative welfare level via 
a finite number of ‘slight’ decreases in welfare.3 The upshot of denying Finite 
Fine-Grainedness is twofold. First, it makes room for a lexical population axiology 
in which welfare levels and population-values are represented by vectors. Views 
of this kind constitute a counterexample to Arrhenius’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Impossibility Theorems. Second, it strips certain adequacy conditions of 
their plausibility. More precisely, it renders doubtful the Inequality Aversion 
condition employed in Arrhenius’s Second and Third Impossibility Theorems. 
Therefore, none of Arrhenius’s six theorems proves that there is no satisfactory 
population axiology. Each theorem depends on Finite Fine-Grainedness for the 
validity of its proof or the plausibility of its adequacy conditions. 
Nevertheless, Arrhenius’s theorems remain important. In this paper, I 
demonstrate that they can be turned into theorems stating the impossibility of a 
satisfactory population prospect axiology: a satisfactory betterness ordering over 
alternatives that have some probability of bringing about one or more distinct 
populations. Since all of our population-affecting actions have a non-zero 
probability of bringing about more than one distinct population, it is population 
prospect axiologies that are of practical relevance, and these amended theorems 
state that no such axiology can satisfy each of a small number of compelling 
adequacy conditions. The key difference is that these theorems employ risky 
versions of Arrhenius’s original conditions. The original conditions mandate, 
roughly, that a drop in welfare for one person can be compensated by a large 
enough increase in welfare elsewhere. The risky versions mandate, again roughly, 
 
1 See, for example, Parfit (1984, chap. 19) Ng (1989), Blackorby and Donaldson (1991), Carlson 
(1998), Kitcher (2000), and Tännsjö (2002). 
2 The first four theorems are in Arrhenius (2000). The fifth is in (2003) and the sixth is in (2009; 
2011). All six are collated in (forthcoming). 
3 Thomas (2018) calls the assumption ‘Small Steps.’ 
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that a slightly increased risk of a drop in welfare for one person can be 
compensated by a large enough increase in welfare elsewhere. These risky 
adequacy conditions are compelling even if Finite Fine-Grainedness is false, so 
lexical views do not escape these amended theorems. 
I begin in Section 2 by outlining the framework of this paper more precisely. 
Then in Section 3 I formulate the adequacy conditions for Arrhenius’s favoured 
Sixth Impossibility Theorem. I give some prima facie reasons to doubt Finite 
Fine-Grainedness in Section 4, after which I sketch out a simple lexical view and 
explain how it escapes the Sixth Theorem. Then in Section 5 I present a risky 
version of the theorem that does not depend on the truth of Finite Fine-
Grainedness. I prove that Arrhenius’s other impossibility theorems can be 
patched up with a similar manoeuvre in the Appendix.  
2. The Framework 
In this paper, I use definitions and structural assumptions broadly in line with 
those of Arrhenius (2011; forthcoming). Two exceptions are worth noting. First, 
I borrow notation from Thomas’s manuscript4 to simplify the presentation of the 
adequacy conditions and proofs. Second, I drop the assumption of Finite Fine-
Grainedness in Section 5 and substitute new assumptions about the ordering of 
population prospects. 
Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems make extensive use of the notion of 
welfare: a measure of how good a person’s life is for them. Lives are individuated 
by the person whose life it is and the kind of life it is, and it is assumed that the 
‘has at least as high welfare as’ relation applied to the set of possible lives is 
reflexive and transitive, but not necessarily complete. Life  is better than life  
iff  has at least as high welfare as  and  does not have at least as high welfare 
as . Lives  and  are incommensurable iff  does not have at least as high 
welfare as  and  does not have at least as high welfare as .5 Lives  and  are 
equally good iff  has at least as high welfare as  and  has at least as high 
welfare as . If two lives are equally good, they are at the same welfare level. 
A life is neutral iff it is equally good for the person living it as some 
standard. This standard is defined differently by different authors. Arrhenius 
(2011, 5) defines it as a neutral welfare component: a component that makes a 
person’s life neither better nor worse. Others define it as nonexistence (Arrhenius 
and Rabinowicz 2015) or a life constantly at a neutral level of temporal welfare 
(Broome 2004, 68; Bykvist 2007, 101). My discussion is compatible with all such 
 
4 http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert2060/webfiles/Reconstructing-Arrhenius-for-web.pdf 
5 We might instead claim that  and  are on a par or imprecisely equally good in this case. For 
the purposes of this the paper, the distinction between these relations is unimportant. See Chang 
(2016) for discussion. 
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definitions. A life is at a positive welfare level iff it is better than the standard, 
and at a negative welfare level iff it is worse than the standard. 
Arrhenius assumes Finite Fine-Grainedness: 
Finite Fine-Grainedness 
There exists a finite sequence of slight welfare differences 
between any two welfare levels. (Arrhenius 2016, 171; 
forthcoming) 
We can leave ‘slight’ to be understood intuitively for now. Suppose, for example, 
that  is a long life and  is an otherwise identical life featuring one less second 
of mild pleasure. The difference between the welfare levels of  and  would 
certainly qualify as slight. 
Arrhenius uses Finite Fine-Grainedness to ensure the existence of a finite, 
linearly ordered set of welfare levels, , with two properties: 
1. The set ranges from a very negative welfare level, through a barely 
negative welfare level and three barely positive welfare levels, each higher 
than the last, up to three very positive welfare levels, each higher than the 
last. 
2. The difference between adjacent welfare levels is slight. 
We can represent the welfare levels in  with integers ranging from  up to  
 + 2: 
 < ⋯ < −1 < 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 < ⋯ <  <  + 1 <  + 2 
Here 0 represents the neutral welfare level, −1 represents a barely negative level, 
and 1, 2, and 3 represent barely positive levels.  represents a very negative level, 
and  and above represent very positive levels. These are all the welfare levels 
employed in Arrhenius’s proofs. 
A population is a set of lives in a possible world. A population axiology is 
an ‘at least as good as’ relation on the set of all possible populations: reflexive 
and transitive, but not necessarily complete. Population  is better than 
population   iff  is at least as good as   and   is not at least as good as . 
Populations  and   are incommensurable iff  is not at least as good as   and 
  is not at least good as .6 Population  is equally good as population   iff 
 is at least as good as   and   is at least as good as . If two populations are 
equally good, they have the same value. 
Two features of Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions are worth noting. The first 
is that they quantify over . This set may be a proper subset of the set of all 
welfare levels, but that possibility is of little consequence. If no population 
axiology can satisfy Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions quantifying over , then no 
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population axiology can satisfy those adequacy conditions quantifying over all 
welfare levels. The second is that each adequacy condition includes an ‘other 
things being equal’ clause. That is needed because populations determine facts 
besides the distribution of welfare, and these facts might be axiologically relevant. 
The purpose of the ‘other things being equal’ clause is to hold all such non-welfare 
facts fixed. 
In what follows, I use ⟦⟧ to denote a population of one life at welfare level 
, and ⟦⟧ to denote a population of  lives at . Uppercase letters like , , 
, and   denote populations which may feature lives at more than one welfare 
level. Populations represented by different letters should be understood as 
pairwise disjoint so that, for example,  and ⟦⟧ have no lives in common.  +
⟦⟧ then denotes a population of all the lives in  and all the lives in ⟦⟧. I 
leave the ‘other things being equal’ clause in each adequacy condition implicit. 
With that proviso, ≻ denotes ‘is better than’ and ⪰ denotes ‘is at least as good 
as.’ 
3. Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem employs the following five adequacy 
conditions: 
Egalitarian Dominance: If population  is a perfectly equal 
population of the same size as population , and every person 
in  has higher welfare than every person in , then  is better 
than . 
Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below , 
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
General Non-Extreme Priority: For any welfare level , 
there exists a number  of lives such that, for any population , 
a population consisting of ,  very positive welfare lives, and 
one life at welfare level  is at least as good as a population 
consisting of ,  barely positive welfare lives, and one life at a 
welfare level slightly above . 
General Non-Extreme Priority (exact formulation): For 
any  ∈ , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any ,  ∈   with 
0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and any population , 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
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Non-Elitism: For any welfare levels , , and ,  slightly higher 
than  and  higher than , and for any one-life population  at 
welfare level , there is a population # at welfare level , and a 
population  of the same size as  + # such that, for any 
population  consisting of lives with welfare ranging from  to 
,  +  is at least as good as  +  + #. 
Non-Elitism (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈  with  −
1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any population  with 
welfare levels ranging from  to , 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
Weak Non-Sadism: There is a negative welfare level and a 
number of lives at this level such that the addition of any number 
of lives with positive welfare is at least as good as the addition 
of the lives with negative welfare. 
Weak Non-Sadism (exact formulation): There exists  ∈
 with  < 0 and  ∈ ℕ such that, for any welfare level  ∈  
with  > 0, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population , 
 + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ 
Weak Quality Addition: There is a number of very negative 
welfare lives such that, for any population , there is a number 
of very positive welfare lives such that the addition of the very 
positive welfare lives to  is at least as good as the addition of 
the very negative welfare lives plus any number of barely positive 
welfare lives to . 
Weak Quality Addition (exact formulation): There exists 
 ∈  with  < 0 and  ∈ ℕ such that, for any population , 
there exists ,  ∈  with 0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and  ∈ ℕ, such that 
for any % ∈ ℕ, 
 + ⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧7 
Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem states that these five adequacy 
conditions are incompatible: 
 
7 This condition differs slightly from that of Arrhenius (2011). Arrhenius has the first two 
quantifiers the other way around, so that the condition begins ‘For any population , there is…’ 
(2011, 9). As Thomas’s manuscript notes, the Sixth Impossibility Theorem actually requires the 
slightly stronger condition stated here. In any case, the stronger version remains a compelling 
adequacy condition.  
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Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem 
There is no population axiology which satisfies Egalitarian 
Dominance, General Non-Extreme Priority, Non-Elitism, Weak 
Non-Sadism, and Weak Quality Addition. (Arrhenius 2011, 9; 
forthcoming) 
However, the theorem is only true given Finite Fine-Grainedness. I prove that 
this is so in the next section, by presenting Lexical Totalism as a counterexample 
to the theorem. But the rough idea is as follows. Arrhenius assumes that, while 
single applications of Non-Elitism and General Non-Extreme Priority reduce a 
person’s welfare only slightly, repeated applications of these conditions can reduce 
a very positive welfare level to a very negative welfare level. As we will see, this 
assumption is exactly what Lexical Totalism denies. 
4. Lexical Totalism 
Recall Finite Fine-Grainedness: 
Finite Fine-Grainedness 
There exists a finite sequence of slight welfare differences 
between any two welfare levels. (Arrhenius 2016, 171; 
forthcoming) 
Although this assumption might seem compelling, there are prima facie reasons 
to doubt it. Consider the following case from Roger Crisp: 
Haydn and the Oyster 
You are a soul in heaven waiting to be allocated a life on Earth. 
It is late Friday afternoon, and you watch anxiously as the 
supply of available lives dwindles. When your turn comes, the 
angel in charge offers you a choice between two lives, that of the 
composer Joseph Haydn and that of an oyster. Besides 
composing some wonderful music and influencing the evolution 
of the symphony, Haydn will meet with success and honour in 
his own lifetime, be cheerful and popular, travel, and gain much 
enjoyment from field sports. The oyster’s life is far less exciting. 
Though this is rather a sophisticated oyster, its life will consist 
only of mild sensual pleasure, rather like that experienced by 
humans when floating very drunk in a warm bath. When you 
request the life of Haydn, the angel sighs, ‘I’ll never get rid of 
this oyster life. It’s been hanging around for ages. Look, I’ll offer 
you a special deal. Haydn will die at the age of seventy‐seven. 
8 
 
But I’ll make the oyster life as long as you like.’ (Crisp 1997, 24; 
2006, 112; see also McTaggart 1927, 452–53) 
Suppose that, as the oyster, you would never get bored of your mild sensual 
pleasure. Many of us share the following two intuitions about this case: 
1. Increasing the length of the oyster life by one day increases its welfare 
level by some slight but constant amount. 
2. An oyster life of any length is at a lower welfare level than the life of 
Haydn. 
This combination of intuitions casts doubt on Finite Fine-Grainedness, for 
although each added day of oyster life yields a constant increase in welfare level, 
no number of additional days can make the oyster life at least as good as the life 
of Haydn.8 What’s more, we might think that the only improvements that could 
bring the oyster life up to Haydn’s welfare level do not come in slight increments. 
Suppose, for example, that the oyster life could be at least as good as Haydn’s 
only if we endowed the oyster with autonomy, or made it capable of love, or gave 
its life meaning. Suppose further that no lives differing in their quantities of 
autonomy, love, or meaning differ only slightly in welfare. In that case, Finite 
Fine-Grainedness would be false. 
We might try to account for these intuitions by claiming that the life of 
Haydn is of infinite value relative to the oyster life. But there are good reasons 
to avoid this move. One is that, if the value of Haydn’s life is infinite, then the 
expected value of any prospect with a non-zero probability of resulting in Haydn’s 
life is also infinite. A prospect that results in Haydn’s life for certain has the same 
infinite expected value as a prospect that results in Haydn’s life with probability 
one-in-a-hundred and an oyster life otherwise. 
A better way of accounting for these intuitions is to represent welfare levels 
with a vector. For example, we can have the welfare level of a life  as a vector 
of higher and lower goods – (ℎ(, )() – each representable by integers without 
upper or lower bound. These welfare levels can then be ordered lexically, so that 
a welfare level (ℎ(, )() is at least as high as a welfare level (ℎ,, ),) iff either ℎ( >
ℎ, or ℎ( = ℎ, and )( ≥ ),. We can specify that autonomy, love, and meaning are 
higher goods, while sensual pleasure is a lower good. Given this specification, the 
life of Haydn contains some non-zero quantity of higher goods and the oyster life 
contains none. The lexical ordering can then account for both of our intuitions. 
Increasing the length of the oyster life by one day increases its quantity of lower 
 
8 The truth of these intuitions would not themselves contradict Finite Fine-Grainedness, because 
it could be that some other way of slightly increasing the oyster’s welfare could eventually render 
the oyster life at least as good as Haydn’s. However, as Carlson (forthcoming) points out, their 
truth would contradict Finite Fine-Grainedness if we also assume that a difference in welfare 
levels is slight only if it is not infinitely greater than some other difference in welfare levels. 
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goods by some slight but constant amount, but no quantity of lower goods in an 
oyster life can match the non-zero quantity of higher goods in the life of Haydn. 
And extending this lexical ordering to cover prospects gives the right results in 
the risky case outlined above. Let Haydn’s welfare level be (, 0) with  > 0 and 
the oyster’s welfare level (0, ) with  > 0, and define the expected value of a 
prospect as a probability-weighted average of the values of its possible outcomes. 
Then the expected value of the prospect that results in Haydn’s life for certain is 
(, 0) and the expected value of the prospect that results in Haydn’s life with 
probability one-in-a-hundred and an oyster life otherwise is (0.01, 0.99). And 
 > 0.01, so the lexical ordering has the former prospect better than the latter.  
We can follow Carlson (forthcoming) in filling out the view as follows: 
A welfare level (ℎ(, )() is 
positive iff ℎ( > 0, or ℎ( = 0 and )( > 0, 
negative iff ℎ( < 0, or ℎ( = 0 and )( < 0, 
neutral iff ℎ( = 0 and )( = 0, 
very positive iff ℎ( ≥ 1, for a particular positive integer 1, 
barely positive only if ℎ( = 0 and )( > 0, 
barely negative only if ℎ( = 0 and )( < 0, and 
very negative iff ℎ( ≤ 2 , for a particular negative integer 2 . 
A welfare level (ℎ(, )() is merely slightly higher than a welfare 
level (ℎ,, ),) only if ℎ( = ℎ, and )( = ), + 3, 3 > 0. 
On this view, Finite Fine-Grainedness is false. A welfare difference is slight only 
if it involves no change in the quantity of higher goods, so no number of slight 
welfare differences can bridge the gap between welfare levels that differ in their 
quantity of higher goods. 
We can order populations in the same way that we order lives. Let the value 
of a population  be represented by the vector (ℎ4, )4), where ℎ4 is the sum of 
all the higher goods and )4 is the sum of all the lower goods in the lives in . 
Population  is at least as good as population   iff either ℎ4 > ℎ5  or ℎ4 = ℎ5  
and )4 ≥ )5 . Call this population axiology Lexical Totalism. 
As Thomas (2018) and Carlson (forthcoming) note, Lexical Totalism is a 
counterexample to Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem. It satisfies all five 
adequacy conditions. It satisfies Egalitarian Dominance because every person in 
 having higher welfare than every person in  entails that total welfare in  is 
higher than in . And it satisfies Weak Non-Sadism because adding any number 
of negative welfare lives reduces total welfare while adding any number of positive 
welfare lives increases it. Weak Quality Addition is satisfied for a similar reason. 
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Adding any number of very positive welfare lives increases total welfare, while 
adding any combination of very negative welfare lives and barely positive welfare 
lives reduces it. More precisely, let (ℎ4, )4) represent the value of . Adding very 
positive welfare lives means adding (6, %) with 6 > 0, while adding a combination 
of very negative welfare lives and barely positive welfare lives means adding (7, 8) 
with 7 < 0. Weak Quality Addition is satisfied because (ℎ4 + 6, )4 + %) is greater 
than (ℎ4 + 7, )4 + 8) no matter what values % and 8 take. 
Lexical Totalism also satisfies General Non-Extreme Priority. Let (ℎ9, )9) 
represent welfare level . Then a population consisting of , one life at , and 
some number of very positive welfare lives has a value of (ℎ4 + ℎ9 + 6, )4 + )9 +
%) with 6 > 0. Meanwhile, a population consisting of , one life at a welfare level 
slightly above  (represented by (ℎ9, )9 + 3) with 3 > 0), and some number of 
barely positive welfare lives has a value of (ℎ4 + ℎ9, )4 + )9 + 3 + 8) with 3 > 0, 
8 > 0. General Non-Extreme Priority is satisfied because (ℎ4 + ℎ9 + 6, )4 + )9 +
%) is greater than (ℎ4 + ℎ9, )4 + )9 + 3 + 8) no matter what values %, 3, and 8 
take. 
Non-Elitism completes the set. Again, let (ℎ9, )9) represent welfare level , 
so that (ℎ9, )9 − 3) with 3 > 0 represents welfare level , and let (ℎ:, ):) represent 
welfare level . Then the value of  +  is (ℎ4 + (ℎ9), )4 + ()9 − 3)) and the 
value of  +  + # is (ℎ4 + ℎ9 + ( − 1)(ℎ:), )4 + )9 + ( − 1)():)). Cancelling 
the ℎ4 and )4 terms, we can see that Non-Elitism is satisfied: ((ℎ9), ()9 − 3)) 
is at least as good as (ℎ9 + ( − 1)(ℎ:), )9 + ( − 1)():)) for some  ∈ ℕ, since 
 >  implies that either ℎ9 > ℎ: or ℎ9 = ℎ: and ()9 − 3) > ):. 
Therefore, Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem is escapable. 
Population axiologies that deny Finite Fine-Grainedness can satisfy all of its 
adequacy conditions. What’s more, these axiologies have other advantages 
besides. Lexical Totalism coheres nicely with our intuitions in cases like Haydn 
and the Oyster, its lexical ordering of lives admits of a natural extension to 
populations and prospects, and all the while it remains faithful to the appealing 
idea that a population is at least as good as another iff it contains at least as 
much welfare. 
Lexical Totalism also satisfies all the adequacy conditions in Arrhenius’s 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Impossibility Theorems.9 The Second and Third 
Impossibility Theorems are a different matter. They feature the following 
adequacy condition: 
Inequality Aversion: For any welfare levels , , and ,  
higher than , and  higher than , and for any population  
with welfare , there is a larger population # with welfare , 
 
9 As Carlson (forthcoming) proves. 
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such that a perfectly equal population  of the same size as  +
# and with welfare , is at least as good as  + #. 
Lexical Totalism violates this condition when, for example,  is a very positive 
welfare level and  and  are barely positive welfare levels. However, in this case, 
Inequality Aversion does not seem particularly compelling. Suppose, for example, 
that  is the welfare level enjoyed by Haydn,  is the welfare level enjoyed by an 
oyster that lives one-hundred years, and  is the welfare level enjoyed by an oyster 
that lives ninety-nine years. Inequality Aversion states that, for any number  of 
lives equally good as Haydn’s, there is some number  of ninety-nine year oyster 
lives such that  +  one-hundred year oyster lives are at least as good as 
 Haydn-quality lives and  ninety-nine year oyster lives. 
In fact, Arrhenius acknowledges that Inequality Aversion is not particularly 
compelling considered alone (forthcoming, 147). But he defends it by deriving it 
from the more compelling Non-Elitism condition (forthcoming, 150f.). His 
derivation, however, depends on Finite Fine-Grainedness (forthcoming, 323–26). 
If we deny Finite Fine-Grainedness, no such thing follows. Therefore, advocates 
of Lexical Totalism can claim that their view satisfies all of the compelling 
adequacy conditions in each of Arrhenius’s six impossibility theorems. 
Kitcher (2000), Thomas (2018), Nebel (2021), and Carlson (forthcoming) 
offer lexical views along these lines. As they note, these views can be tweaked 
and generalised in various ways. Welfare levels could be represented by vectors 
with any number of elements, each element could be represented by any subset 
of the real numbers, and the ordering could employ thresholds of various kinds 
to account for incommensurability. Suppose, for example, that population  is 
at least as good as population   iff either ℎ4– ℎ5 > ∆ or ℎ4 ≥ ℎ5  and )4 ≥ )5 . 
In that case, it could be that neither of  and   is at least as good as the other. 
It could also be indeterminate whether the quantity of higher goods in a life 
exceeds some threshold, in which case the ordering of lives and populations will 
also admit of indeterminacy. 
All such views, however, must deny Finite Fine-Grainedness to avoid 
Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem, and we might complain that this denial 
is not well-motivated.10 One line of argument in favour of Finite Fine-Grainedness 
is as follows. Every plausible candidate for being a higher good (e.g. autonomy, 
love, meaning) comes in fine-grained quantities, and if two lives are identical but 
for a slight difference in their quantity of some higher good, they differ only 
slightly in welfare. These two premises imply Finite Fine-Grainedness. 
This argument has some force, but it is hardly irresistible. Deniers of Finite 
Fine-Grainedness point out that the nature of welfare remains an open question 
 
10 Another objection is that lexical views imply the Lexical Dilemma. See Thornley (forthcoming) 
for this objection and a response. 
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(Thomas 2018, 829–30; Nebel 2021, 10, 36; Carlson forthcoming, 22–26). We 
simply do not know what makes a life good, and so we do not know that higher 
goods are fine-grained. What’s more, they can draw on a whole array of 
axiological phenomena to flesh out the case for doubt. Mill’s distinction between 
higher and lower pleasures is one starting point. He claims that some pairs of 
pleasures are such that ‘those who are competently acquainted with both’ place 
one ‘so far above the other that they… would not resign it for any quantity of the 
other pleasure.’ (Mill 1861, chap. 2, para. 5). And there is no smooth sequence 
between these higher and lower pleasures because they depend on different 
faculties. Higher pleasures depend on our ‘intellect,’ ‘imagination,’ and ‘moral 
sentiments,’ while lower pleasures require only ‘mere sensation.’ (Mill 1861, chap. 
2, para. 4). From this foundation, it is just a short step to the claim that a life 
featuring higher pleasures differs markedly in welfare from any life lacking them. 
Another argument comes from Nebel. He suggests that even if autonomy 
and meaning are fine-grained, the primary determinant of welfare might be the 
binary instantiation of these goods (Nebel 2021, 11–12). Perhaps no life that is 
meaningful simpliciter is merely slightly better than a life that is meaningless 
simpliciter. Granted, ‘meaningful’ is almost certainly a vague term, but that is 
no reason to reject the view. Many compelling moral principles contain vague 
terms. One example is the claim that it is wrong to experiment on a subject that 
has not given their informed consent. And vagueness plays a key role in many 
population axiologies too. Broome (2004, 180–82), for example, claims that it can 
be vague whether a life is better lived than not lived.  
Meanwhile, Griffin (1988, 86) and Carlson (forthcoming) suggest that higher 
goods might be a composite of other goods, none of which is in itself higher. A 
life might have to instantiate autonomy, love, knowledge, virtue, and meaning to 
some degree in order to reach a very positive welfare level, and any life 
instantiating just four of these five goods might be at a welfare level markedly 
lower. The presence of all five might be a kind of Moorean ‘organic unity’ in 
which the whole is more than the sum of its parts (Moore 1903, 78–80). 
These accounts are incomplete, but plausible enough in their outlines. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that a population axiology is unsatisfactory simply 
because it violates Finite Fine-Grainedness, and any argument to this effect must 
reckon with a whole array of axiological phenomena. Determining whether a 
satisfactory population axiology is possible thus seems to require resolving some 
tricky questions about the nature of welfare. 
I claim, however, that no such axiological enquiries are necessary. What 
matters for all practical purposes is the possibility of a satisfactory population 
prospect axiology, and the impossibility of such an axiology can be proved without 
employing Finite Fine-Grainedness. The key insight is that expected welfare levels 
are finitely fine-grained, even if welfare levels are not. 
13 
 
5. The Risky Sixth Impossibility Theorem 
My risky versions of Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems employ the notion of a 
population prospect which I define, somewhat clunkily, as an alternative with some 
non-zero probability of bringing about one or more distinct populations. These 
population prospects can be divided into the trivial and the non-trivial. Trivial 
population prospects are those alternatives that bring about some population with 
probability 1. Non-trivial population prospects are those alternatives that bring 
about two or more distinct populations with probabilities strictly between 0 and 
1.11 
We might denote non-trivial population prospects with [611,… , 6BB], 
where each 6D is a probability (with 0 < 6D < 1 and 61 + ⋯+ 6B = 1) and each 
D is a population. The prospect [611,… , 6BB] brings about 1 with 
probability 61, 2 with probability 62, and so on. However, this notation quickly 
becomes unwieldy for prospects that bring about different sets of lives with 
different probabilities. Suppose, for example, that a prospect brings about ⟦⟧ 
with probability 6, ⟦ − 1⟧ with probability 1 − 6,   with probability 1, and no 
other lives with non-zero probability. We could denote this prospect with 
[(6)(⟦⟧ +  ), (1 − 6)(⟦ − 1⟧ +  )], but it is simpler to separate those 
populations brought about with probability less than 1 from those populations 
brought about with certainty, so that we denote the prospect with 
[(6)⟦⟧, (1 − 6)⟦ − 1⟧] +  . I adopt the simpler convention in what follows. 
Given my definitions, Arrhenius’s original theorems can be understood as 
stating that there is no satisfactory betterness ordering over trivial population 
prospects. I go beyond these theorems in assuming that the ‘at least as good as’ 
relation applies to non-trivial population prospects as well as trivial ones. More 
precisely, I assume that the ‘at least as good as’ relation is reflexive over the set 
of population prospects and that it holds, at least sometimes, when one or both 
of its relata are non-trivial population prospects. This assumption seems difficult 
to deny. Suppose that a first alternative brings about a population of one million 
people living wonderful lives with probability 0.5 and a population of one million 
people living almost-wonderful lives otherwise, and that a second alternative 
 
11 These definitions are in line with those given by Arrhenius and Stefánsson (2020) in their 
manuscript on population ethics under risk. Arrhenius and Stefánsson also offer impossibility 
theorems in population prospect axiology. However, their theorems employ different axioms to 
the theorems below. Their axioms do not so obviously dispense with the need to assume Finite 
Fine-Grainedness. 
As Arrhenius and Stefánsson note, the literature in population ethics has thus far mostly 
disregarded questions of risk. For exceptions, see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005), 
Roberts (2007), Asheim and Zuber (2016), Thomas (2016), Nebel (2017; 2019; 2021), Budolfson 
and Spears (2018), and Spears and Budolfson (2019).  
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brings about a population of one million people living awful lives with probability 
1. It seems obvious that the first alternative is better than the second.12 
What’s more, denying that any non-trivial population prospect is better 
than any other would strip one’s chosen population axiology of all practical 
relevance, since all of our population-affecting actions have some non-zero 
probability of bringing about more than one distinct population. Suppose, for 
example, that a government minister is considering a policy that would reduce 
the cost of childcare. Whether she implements the policy or not, there is no single 
population that will come about with probability 1, so all of her alternatives are 
non-trivial population prospects. If no such prospects are better than any others, 
then population axiology cannot inform her decision. The same goes for more 
personal decisions. My having a child has a non-zero probability of resulting in 
more than one distinct population, because it is uncertain how many children my 
child will have. And the effects of refraining are not certain either. There’s always 
a chance that it will spur a government minister to implement a policy reducing 
the cost of childcare. 
I also assume that the ‘at least as good as’ relation is transitive over the set 
of population prospects. Some authors deny the transitivity assumption in 
Arrhenius’s original impossibility theorems (Rachels 2004; Temkin 2012), and one 
might be tempted to do the same here. However, this move strikes most as a 
drastic step. At worst, it is denying a logical truth (Broome 2004, chap. 4). At 
best, it requires a radical upheaval of axiology and practical rationality. 
Recall that Arrhenius uses Finite Fine-Grainedness to ensure the existence 
of a finite, linearly ordered set of welfare levels, , with two properties: 
1. The set ranges from a very negative welfare level, through a barely 
negative welfare level and three barely positive welfare levels, each higher 
than the last, up to three very positive welfare levels, each higher than the 
last. 
2. The difference between adjacent welfare levels is slight. 
If Finite Fine-Grainedness is false in the way that Lexical Totalists suggest, there 
is no such set. But there will still be finite, linearly ordered sets of welfare levels 
with just the first property. We can pick out one such set in which many of the 
differences between adjacent welfare levels are slight, and those differences that 
 
12 In this example, the first alternative stochastically dominates the second. But there are other 
compelling examples of betterness over prospects that do not have this feature. Suppose, for 
example, that a first alternative brings about a population of one million people living wonderful 
lives with probability 1, and a second alternative brings about a population of one million people 
living ever-so-slightly-better-than-wonderful lives with probability 0.00001 and a population of 
one million people living awful lives otherwise. The first alternative seems better than the second. 
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are not slight are not egregiously big either. Call this set *. As before, we can 
represent these welfare levels with integers ranging from  up to  + 2: 
 < ⋯ < −1 < 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 < ⋯ <  <  + 1 <  + 2 
Again, 0 represents the neutral welfare level, −1 represents a barely negative 
level, 1, 2, and 3 represent barely positive levels,  represents a very negative 
level, and  and above represent very positive levels. This time, however, there is 
at least one pair of adjacent welfare levels that differ more than slightly. 
Two features that my adequacy conditions share with Arrhenius’s are worth 
reiterating. First, my adequacy conditions quantify over *. Like Arrhenius’s , 
this set may be a proper subset of all possible welfare levels, but that possibility 
is of little consequence. If no population prospect axiology can satisfy these 
adequacy conditions quantifying over *, then no population prospect axiology 
can satisfy these adequacy conditions quantifying over all welfare levels. The 
second is that my adequacy conditions also leave an ‘other things being equal’ 
clause implicit. 
Now recall the General Non-Extreme Priority and Non-Elitism conditions 
employed in Arrhenius’s Sixth Impossibility Theorem. Applied to *, the 
informal statements and the exact formulations of these conditions come apart. 
The informal statements refer to welfare levels that differ slightly while the exact 
formulations refer to adjacent welfare levels, and * features at least one pair of 
adjacent welfare levels that differ more than slightly. As we have seen, the 
informal versions of Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions are not incompatible over 
*, because repeated applications of these conditions cannot reduce a very 
positive welfare level to a very negative one. They cannot ‘jump the gap’ between 
the pair(s) of adjacent welfare levels that differ more than slightly. The exact 
formulations, on the other hand, are incompatible over *, since they pay no 
heed to the size of the difference between adjacent welfare levels. Applied to *, 
the conditions are as follows: 
General Non-Extreme Priority over * (exact 
formulation): For any  ∈  *, there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, 
for any ,  ∈  * with 0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and any population , 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Non-Elitism over * (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈
 * with  − 1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any 
population  with welfare levels ranging from  to , 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
However, both of these conditions are open to doubt. Consider first General Non-
Extreme Priority. Suppose that the difference between welfare levels  and  + 1 
is not slight. Perhaps  + 1 corresponds to a life featuring only ‘lower bads’ like 
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non-debilitating harm, whereas  corresponds to a life featuring ‘higher bads’ like 
debilitating harm (see Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018). In that case, we might 
claim that  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ is worse than  + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ no matter how large 
 is. No number of very positive welfare lives can make up for a life featuring 
debilitating harm. 
We might doubt Non-Elitism for a similar reason. Suppose this time that 
the difference between welfare levels  and  − 1 is not slight. Perhaps  
corresponds to a life featuring a higher good like autonomy, whereas  − 1 and  
correspond to lives featuring only lower goods like sensual pleasure. In that case, 
we might claim that  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ is worse than  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ no 
matter how large  is. No increase in the quantity of sensual pleasure can make 
up for the loss of autonomy.  
However, I claim that the following risky versions of General Non-Extreme 
Priority and Non-Elitism are compelling, even quantified over *: 
Risky General Non-Extreme Priority (exact 
formulation): For any  ∈  *, there exists  ∈ ℕ and 6 of 
the form 1F with 7 ∈ ℕ such that, for any G ∈ ℝ with 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 −
6, any ,  ∈  * with 0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and any population , 
 + [(1 − G)⟦⟧, (G)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦⟧
⪯  + [(1 − G − 6)⟦⟧, (G + 6)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦⟧ 
Risky Non-Elitism (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈  * 
with  − 1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ and 6 of the form 1F with 7 ∈
ℕ such that, for any G ∈ ℝ with 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 − 6 and any 
population  consisting of lives with welfare ranging from  to 
, 
 + [(1 − G)⟦⟧, (G)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦⟧
⪯  + [(1 − G − 6)⟦⟧, (G + 6)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
This assortment of quantifiers and variables is somewhat difficult to parse, but 
the rough idea is as follows. Arrhenius’s original conditions mandate that some 
fixed drop in welfare for one person can always be compensated by a rise in 
welfare for some number of other people. The risky versions mandate only that 
some fixed increase in the risk of some drop in welfare for one person can always 
be compensated by a rise in welfare for some number of other people. The size of 
this fixed increase in risk could be very small. The only restriction is that 
multiplying it by some natural number gives an answer of 1. And that makes 
these risky conditions compelling even in cases where the original conditions are 
not. Consider again the case that casts doubt on General Non-Extreme Priority: 
 corresponds to a life featuring some debilitating harm,  + 1 corresponds to a 
life featuring only non-debilitating harm,  corresponds to a barely positive 
welfare life, and  corresponds to a very positive welfare life. Risky General Non-
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Extreme Priority states only that some tiny increase in the risk of a drop in 
welfare from a life of non-debilitating harm to a life featuring some debilitating 
harm can be compensated by raising some number of lives from barely positive 
welfare levels to very positive welfare levels. This increase in risk could be 10−100 
(0.0 …1 with 99 zeroes between the decimal-point and the 1). To get a grip on 
just how small this increase is, consider the following. Suppose you had a biased 
coin that came up heads with probability 10−100. Even if you had flipped this 
coin one million times per millisecond from the Big Bang up until now, your 
chance of seeing one or more heads would still be less than 10−73 (0.0…1 with 
72 zeroes between the decimal-point and the 1).13 One person’s undergoing this 
(nigh-on non-existent) increase in risk can surely be compensated by raising some 
number of lives from barely positive to very positive welfare levels.  
The same goes for Risky Non-Elitism. It is compelling even in cases where 
the original Non-Elitism condition is not. Again, let  correspond to a life 
featuring some higher good like autonomy,  − 1 correspond to a life featuring 
only sensual pleasure, and  correspond to a life featuring slightly less sensual 
pleasure. Risky Non-Elitism states only that some tiny increase in the risk of a 
drop in welfare from a life of autonomy to a life of sensual pleasure can be 
compensated by some increase in the quantity of sensual pleasure elsewhere. 
Again, this increase in risk could be a nigh-on non-existent 10−100. That makes 
Risky Non-Elitism very difficult to deny. 
These risky conditions, in conjunction with the transitivity of the ‘at least 
as good as’ relation over population prospects, imply that the original conditions 
are true over the welfare levels in *. Risky General Non-Extreme Priority plus 
transitivity implies General Non-Extreme Priority proper, and Risky Non-Elitism 
plus transitivity implies Non-Elitism proper, as I prove below. First, General Non-
Extreme Priority: 
Fix any  as in General Non-Extreme Priority. From Risky 
General Non-Extreme Priority, we obtain corresponding , 6, 
and 7. Let  = 7. Consider the following population with any 
 and  as in General Non-Extreme Priority: 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Since  = 7, the above can be expressed as follows, with all 
D = : 
 
13 Rounding up the time since the Big Bang to 14 billion years, there have been 4.415 × 1020 
milliseconds between then and now. Flipping the coin one million times per millisecond give 
4.415 × 1026 coin flips. Subtracting 10−100 from 1 and raising the answer to the power of 
4.415 × 1026 gives the probability of seeing 0 heads. Subtracting this probability from 1 gives 
4.415 × 10−74. 
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 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Applying Risky General Non-Extreme Priority yields the 
following, with any  as in General Non-Extreme Priority: 
⪯  + [(1 − 6)⟦ + 1⟧, (6)⟦⟧] + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Applying it again yields: 
⪯  + [(1 − 26)⟦ + 1⟧, (26)⟦⟧] + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Applying it 7 − 2 more times yields: 
⪯  + [(1 − 76)⟦ + 1⟧, (76)⟦⟧] + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Since 76 = 1, the above simplifies to: 
 + ⟦⟧ + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Since  = 7, the above simplifies to: 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
And by the transitivity of the ‘at least as good as’ relation, we 
can conclude: 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Which is General Non-Extreme Priority, as desired. 
Second, Non-Elitism: 
Fix any ,  as in Non-Elitism. From Risky Non-Elitism, we 
obtain corresponding , 6, and 7. Let  = 7. Consider the 
following population with any  as in Non-Elitism: 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Since  = 7, the above can be expressed as follows, with all 
D = : 
 + ⟦⟧ + 1⟦⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦⟧ 
Applying Risky Non-Elitism yields: 
⪯  + [(1 − 6)⟦⟧, (6)⟦ − 1⟧] + 1⟦ − 1⟧ + 2⟦⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯ + F⟦⟧ 
Applying it again yields: 
⪯  + [(1 − 26)⟦⟧, (26)⟦ − 1⟧] + 1⟦ − 1⟧ + 2⟦ − 1⟧ + 3⟦⟧ + ⋯
+ F⟦⟧ 
Applying it 7 − 2 more times yields: 
⪯  + [(1 − 76)⟦⟧, (76)⟦ − 1⟧] + 1⟦ − 1⟧ + 2⟦ − 1⟧ + 3⟦ − 1⟧ + ⋯
+ F⟦ − 1⟧ 
Since 76 = 1, the above simplifies to: 
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 + ⟦ − 1⟧ + 1⟦ − 1⟧ + 2⟦ − 1⟧ + 3⟦ − 1⟧ + ⋯+ F⟦ − 1⟧ 
Since  = 7, the above simplifies to: 
 + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
And by the transitivity of the ‘at least as good as’ relation, we 
can conclude: 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
Which is Non-Elitism, as desired. 
The impossibility theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original 
conditions understood as adequacy conditions on population prospects and 
quantified over *. The proof is isomorphic to that given by Arrhenius (2011; 
forthcoming), so I will not repeat it here.14 The conclusion is as follows: 
The Risky Sixth Impossibility Theorem 
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Risky General Non-Extreme Priority, 
Risky Non-Elitism, Weak Non-Sadism, and Weak Quality 
Addition. 
Each of these adequacy conditions is compelling even if Finite Fine-Grainedness 
is false, so lexical views do not escape this impossibility theorem. They must 
violate Risky General Non-Extreme Priority or Risky Non-Elitism, or else take 
the drastic step of claiming that the ‘at least as good as’ relation is intransitive 
over population prospects. Therefore, the Risky Sixth Impossibility Theorem 
demonstrates that there is no satisfactory population prospect axiology.15 
6. Appendix 
In this section, I prove that Arrhenius’s other impossibility theorems can be 
patched up with a similar manoeuvre. Each can be turned into a theorem stating 
that no population prospect axiology satisfies a small number of adequacy 
conditions, independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness. 
6.1 The Risky First Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s First Impossibility Theorem states that the following adequacy 
conditions are incompatible: 
 
14 Although note that Thomas’s manuscript points out that the proof in Arrhenius (2011) contains 
a minor mistake. The theorem actually requires the slightly stronger version of Weak Quality 
Addition formulated above. See footnote 7. 
15 I thank Teruji Thomas, William MacAskill, Andreas Mogensen, and an anonymous reviewer 
for helpful comments and discussion. 
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Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below ,  
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
Quantity (exact formulation): For any  ∈ ,  > 1, and 
 ∈ ℕ, there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, 
⟦⟧ ⪯ ⟦ − 1⟧ 
Quality (exact formulation): There exists  ∈ ℕ such that, 
for any  ∈ ℕ, 
⟦3⟧ ⪯ ⟦⟧ 
Quantity is not particularly compelling applied to *, because some pair of 
welfare levels  and  − 1 differ more than slightly. However, Risky Quantity is 
compelling: 
Risky Quantity (exact formulation): For any  ∈ * with 
 > 1 and  ∈ ℕ, there exists ℎ ∈ ℕ and 6 of the form 1F with 
7 ∈ ℕ such that, for any G ∈ ℝ with 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 − 6 and S ∈ ℕ ∪
{0}, 
[(1 − G)⟦⟧, (G)⟦ − 1⟧] + S⟦ − 1⟧
⪯ [(1 − G − 6)⟦⟧, (G + 6)⟦ − 1⟧] + S⟦ − 1⟧ + ℎ⟦ − 1⟧ 
It states, roughly, that a fixed increase in the risk of a drop in welfare for the 
best-off in a population (from one positive welfare level to another) can always 
be compensated by the addition of some number of lives at the lower positive 
welfare level. Risky Quantity plus transitivity implies that Quantity is true over 
*: 
Fix any  and  as in Quantity. From Risky Quantity, we obtain 
corresponding 6 and 7. We will apply Risky Quantity 7 times, 
with different values of S. Consider first S1 = 0. From Risky 
Quantity, we obtain ℎ1. Then inductively set SD+1 = SD + ℎD and 
obtain ℎD+1. Finally, set  =  + ℎ1 + ℎ2 + ℎ3 + ⋯+ ℎF. 
Consider the following population: 
⟦⟧ 
Applying Risky Quantity yields: 
⪯ [(1 − 6)⟦⟧, (6)⟦ − 1⟧] + ℎ1⟦ − 1⟧ 
Applying it again yields: 
⪯ [(1 − 26)⟦⟧, (26)⟦ − 1⟧] + ℎ1⟦ − 1⟧ + ℎ2⟦ − 1⟧ 
Applying it 7 − 2 more times yields: 
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⪯ [(1 − 76)⟦⟧, (76)⟦ − 1⟧] + ℎ1⟦ − 1⟧ + ℎ2⟦ − 1⟧ + ⋯ + ℎF⟦ − 1⟧ 
Since 76 = 1 and  =  + ℎ1 + ℎ2 + ℎ3 + ⋯+ ℎF, the above 
simplifies to: 
⟦ − 1⟧ 
And by the transitivity of the ‘at least as good as’ relation, we 
can conclude: 
⟦⟧ ⪯ ⟦ − 1⟧ 
Which is Quantity, as desired. 
The theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original conditions understood 
as adequacy conditions on population prospects and quantified over *. The 
proof is isomorphic to that given by Arrhenius (2000; forthcoming). The 
conclusion is as follows:  
The Risky First Impossibility Theorem  
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Risky Quantity, and Quality.  
6.2 The Risky Second Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s Second Impossibility Theorem states that the following adequacy 
conditions are incompatible: 
Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below ,  
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
Dominance Addition (exact formulation): For any  and 
  of the same size with all welfare levels in  higher than all 
welfare levels in  , any  ∈  with  > 0, and any  ∈ ℕ, 
 + ⟦⟧ ⊀   
Inequality Aversion (exact formulation): For any , ,  ∈
 with  >  > , and any  ∈ ℕ, there exists % ∈ ℕ such that, 
⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ ⪯ ( + %)⟦⟧ 
Quality (exact formulation): There exists  ∈ ℕ such that, 
for any  ∈ ℕ, 
⟦3⟧ ⪯ ⟦⟧ 
Inequality Aversion is not particularly compelling applied to *. However, Risky 
Non-Elitism is compelling, and we saw above that Risky Non-Elitism plus 
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transitivity implies that Non-Elitism is true over *. Non-Elitism, in turn, 
implies Inequality Aversion: 
Fix any , , ,  as in Inequality Aversion. From Non-Elitism, 
we obtain corresponding 1: the number of lives we must raise 
from  to  − 1 to compensate one life falling from  to  − 1. 
Let 1 =  and %1 = 11, so that %1 gives the number of lives 
we must raise from  to  − 1 to compensate  lives falling from 
 to  − 1. From Non-Elitism, we also obtain 2: the number of 
lives we must raise from  to  − 2 to compensate one life falling 
from  − 1 to  − 2, and so on. Let 2 = 1 + %1 and %2 =
22, and so on, so that for all X up to X =  − : 
D = D−1 + %D−1 
%D = DD 
Consider the following population with % = %1 + %2 + ⋯+ %9−Y: 
⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ 
Since % = %1 + %2 + ⋯+ %9−Y, the above can be expressed as: 
⟦⟧ + %1⟦⟧ + %2⟦⟧ + ⋯+ %9−Y⟦⟧ 
Applying Non-Elitism 1 times yields: 
⪯ ⟦ − 1⟧ + %1⟦ − 1⟧ + %2⟦⟧ + ⋯ + %9−Y⟦⟧ 
Applying it 2 times yields: 
⪯ ⟦ − 2⟧ + %1⟦ − 2⟧ + %2⟦ − 2⟧ + ⋯+ %9−Y⟦⟧ 
Applying it a further 3 + ⋯+ 9−Y times yields: 
⪯ ⟦⟧ + %1⟦⟧ + %2⟦⟧ + ⋯ + %9−Y⟦⟧ 
Since % = %1 + %2 + ⋯+ %9−Y, this simplifies to: 
( + %)⟦⟧ 
And by the transitivity of the ‘at least as good as’ relation, we 
can conclude: 
⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ ⪯ ( + %)⟦⟧ 
Which is Inequality Aversion, as desired. 
The theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original conditions understood 
as adequacy conditions on population prospects and quantified over *. The 
proof is isomorphic to that given by Arrhenius (2000; forthcoming). The 
conclusion is as follows: 
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The Risky Second Impossibility Theorem  
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Dominance Addition, Risky Non-
Elitism, and Quality. 
6.3 The Risky Third Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s Third Impossibility Theorem states that the following adequacy 
conditions are incompatible: 
Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below ,  
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
Inequality Aversion (exact formulation): For any , ,  ∈
 with  >  > , and any  ∈ ℕ, there exists % ∈ ℕ such that, 
⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ ⪯ ( + %)⟦⟧ 
Non-Sadism (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈  with  >
0 > , any , ∈ ℕ, and any population , 
 + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ 
Non-Extreme Priority (exact formulation): There exists 
 ∈ ℕ such that, for any population , 
 + ⟦3⟧ + ⟦3⟧ ⪯  + ⟦−1⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Quality Addition (exact formulation): For any population 
, there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any  ∈ ℕ, 
 + ⟦3⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ 
We might doubt that Inequality Aversion and Non-Extreme Priority are true over 
*. However, as we saw above, Inequality Aversion follows from Risky Non-
Elitism. Non-Extreme Priority, meanwhile, follows from Risky Non-Extreme 
Priority: 
Risky Non-Extreme Priority (exact formulation): There 
exists  ∈ ℕ, and 6 of the form 1F with 7 ∈ ℕ such that, for any 
G ∈ ℝ with 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 − 6 and any population , 
 + [(1 − G)⟦3⟧, (G)⟦−1⟧] + ⟦3⟧ ⪯  + [(1 − G − 6)⟦3⟧, (G + 6)⟦−1⟧] + ⟦⟧ 
These versions of General Non-Extreme Priority and Risky General Non-Extreme 
Priority differ only insofar as they replace welfare levels  + 1, , , and  with 
3, −1, 3, and β respectively. Therefore, the proof that Non-Extreme Priority 
follows from Risky Non-Extreme Priority is isomorphic to the proof that General 
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Non-Extreme Priority follows from Risky General Non-Extreme Priority given 
above. The theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original conditions 
understood as adequacy conditions on population prospects and quantified over 
*. That proof is isomorphic to the one given by Arrhenius (2000; forthcoming). 
The conclusion is as follows: 
The Risky Third Impossibility Theorem 
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Risky Non-Elitism, Non-Sadism, Risky 
Non-Extreme Priority, and Quality Addition. 
6.4 The Risky Fourth Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s Fourth Impossibility Theorem states that the following adequacy 
conditions are incompatible: 
Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below ,  
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
General Non-Extreme Priority (exact formulation): For 
any  ∈  , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any ,  ∈  with 
0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and any population , 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Non-Elitism (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈  with  −
1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any population  with 
welfare levels ranging from  to , 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
Weak Non-Sadism (exact formulation): There exists  ∈
 with  < 0 and  ∈ ℕ such that, for any welfare level  ∈  
with  > 0, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population , 
 + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ 
Quality Addition (exact formulation): For any population 
, there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any  ∈ ℕ, 
 + ⟦3⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ 
As we saw above, General Non-Extreme Priority and Non-Elitism follow from 
their risky versions. The theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original 
conditions understood as adequacy conditions on population prospects and 
quantified over *. The proof is isomorphic to that given by Arrhenius (2000; 
forthcoming). The conclusion is as follows: 
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The Risky Fourth Impossibility Theorem  
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Risky General Non-Extreme Priority, 
Risky Non-Elitism, Weak Non-Sadism, and Quality Addition. 
6.5 The Risky Fifth Impossibility Theorem 
Arrhenius’s Fifth Impossibility Theorem states that the following adequacy 
conditions are incompatible:  
Egalitarian Dominance (exact formulation): For any  ∈
, any  ∈ ℕ, and any population  of size  with all lives at 
welfare levels below ,  
 ≺ ⟦⟧ 
Dominance Addition (exact formulation): For any  and 
  of the same size with all welfare levels in  higher than all 
welfare levels in  , any  ∈  with  > 0, and any  ∈ ℕ, 
 + ⟦⟧ ⊀   
General Non-Elitism (exact formulation): For any ,  ∈
 with  − 1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any 
population , 
 + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦ − 1⟧ + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
General Non-Extreme Priority (exact formulation): For 
any  ∈ , there exists  ∈ ℕ such that, for any ,  ∈   with 
0 <  ≤ 3,  ≥ , and any population , 
 + ⟦ + 1⟧ + ⟦⟧ ⪯  + ⟦⟧ + ⟦⟧ 
Weak Quality (exact formulation): There exists ,  ∈  
with  ≥ ,  < 0, and ,  ∈ ℕ such that, for any  ∈  with 
0 <  ≤ 3 and any % ∈ ℕ, 
⟦⟧ + %⟦⟧ ⪯ ⟦⟧ 
As we saw above, General Non-Extreme Priority follows from its risky version. 
The same is true of General Non-Elitism. It follows from Risky General Non-
Elitism:  
Risky General Non-Elitism (exact formulation): For any 
,  ∈ * with  − 1 > , there exists  ∈ ℕ and 6 of the form 
1
F with 7 ∈ ℕ such that, for any G ∈ ℝ with 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 − 6 and 
any population , 
 + [(1 − G)⟦⟧, (G)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦⟧
⪯  + [(1 − G − 6)⟦⟧, (G + 6)⟦ − 1⟧] + ⟦ − 1⟧ 
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These generalised versions of Non-Elitism and Risky Non-Elitism differ only 
insofar as they relax the restriction on the welfare levels contained in , so the 
proof that General Non-Elitism follows from Risky General Non-Elitism is 
isomorphic to the proof that Non-Elitism follows from Risky Non-Elitism given 
above. The theorem can then be proved using Arrhenius’s original conditions 
understood as adequacy conditions on population prospects and quantified over 
*. That proof is isomorphic to the one given by Arrhenius (2003). The 
conclusion is as follows: 
The Risky Fifth Impossibility Theorem 
There is no population prospect axiology which satisfies 
Egalitarian Dominance, Dominance Addition, Risky General 
Non-Elitism, Risky General Non-Extreme Priority, and Weak 
Quality. 
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